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Round table
Discussion
The Global Fund is being naïve in simply exempting 
tobacco and arms producers from its remit.27 The products 
sold by these corporations may be unique but their conduct 
is unlikely to be and these two issues should not be confused. 
Whether a company sells cigarettes or alcohol, its main goal 
is to maximize shareholder returns. Policies that could reduce 
such returns are, therefore, antithetical to its interests.28 Indeed, 
evidence suggests tobacco and alcohol companies (with some 
evidence relating specifically to SABMiller) use remarkably 
similar strategies in their efforts both to market their products 
and prevent and delay effective public health policies, in some 
instances working collectively to this end.21,29–33 It is also note-
worthy, given the educational component of the funded inter-
vention, that evidence suggests that educational interventions 
are the least effective means of reducing alcohol-related harm, 
and that alcohol industry-funded educational programmes are 
ineffective and potentially counter-productive,29,31 like their 
counterparts funded by the tobacco industry.34,35
While the need for funding will continue to drive cor-
porate philanthropy in global health, until those developing 
or funding alcohol interventions address these potential 
conflicts better, problems such as this one under discussion 
will recur and the harms arising from alcohol misuse will fail 
to be addressed. Even in the field of tobacco control, which is 
arguably leading the way in this area,26 the drive for resources 
continues to result in conflicts.36–38 It is clear that robust rules 
for managing potential conflicts of interest are required to 
ensure effective philanthropy in the public interest.38,39
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At the heart of the problems described in this round table 
discussion1 is the apparent failure by both the Global Fund and 
the Government of South Africa to recognize and adequately 
address the potential conflict between corporate interests 
and public health goals. In the current example involving 
SABMiller, the world’s second largest brewer by sales volume, 
a conflict of interest arises because of well-established links 
between alcohol use, violence (including sexual violence) and 
risky sexual behaviour,2,3 making alcohol a risk factor in the 
spread of HIV infection.4–7 Reducing alcohol use can therefore 
be seen as key to reducing HIV infection.8–10 Yet this inevita-
bly conflicts with SABMiller’s underlying goal of maximizing 
profits from alcohol sales.
While we are unable to comment in detail on this spe-
cific case, the commentaries would suggest that the initial 
failure to recognize this conflict of interest lies with the South 
African Government, which entered into a partnership with 
SABMiller before the Global Fund funded this public–private 
partnership. Industries whose products are harmful to health 
are increasingly attempting to enter into such partnerships as 
part of their corporate social responsibility strategies. Evidence 
suggests that these corporate social responsibility strategies 
are intended to facilitate access to government, co-opt non-
governmental organizations to corporate agendas, build trust 
among the public and political elite and promote untested, 
voluntary solutions over binding regulation.11–14 Furthermore, 
corporate social responsibility strategies, including corporate 
philanthropy, have also been used to create divisions among 
public health professionals.15,16 The two previous commentaries 
highlight this very danger. 
The failure to recognize potential conflicts of interest 
between the alcohol industry and public health policies aimed 
at reducing the harm from alcohol is unfortunately not unique 
to South Africa.17 Most recently, despite prior calls for the 
recognition of such conflicts,18 the food and alcohol industries 
were invited to participate in the United Nations high-level 
meeting on noncommunicable diseases in what one advocate 
apparently likened to “letting Dracula advise on blood-bank 
security”.19 Predictably, given existing evidence on efforts by the 
alcohol industry to prevent effective public health policies,2–23 
they pushed for voluntary rather than regulatory approaches.19 
Similarly, the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) strategy to 
reduce the harmful use of alcohol requests that Member States 
encourage the mobilization and engagement of all concerned 
social and economic groups including industry associations.24 
This call for engagement stands in marked contrast to WHO’s 
approach to tobacco which, since 2000, has explicitly recog-
nized and actively addressed potential conflicts.25 Indeed, 
WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control includes 
Article 5.3 which requires Parties to the treaty “to protect these 
[tobacco control] policies from commercial and other vested 
interests of the tobacco industry”.26
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